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Abstract 
 
The euro crisis made visible the omitted stage in the European integration process. The 
EU jumped from the common market straight to the monetary union, neglecting the 
formation of the economic union. The new EU economic governance is a combination 
of a vertical shift of competences, i.e. from one level of government to another level, 
and a horizontal shift of powers and competences, i.e. from elected governments to 
unelected government bodies entrusted with (parts of) government policies, from 
discretionary policy towards rules.  In both types there is a risk of accountability 
problems, although of a different kind. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the new EU economic governance within the 
conceptual framework of these vertical and horizontal shifts. This two-dimensional 
approach offers a better analytical tool than the more traditional one-dimensional fiscal 
federalism approach. In the first part of the paper the focus is on the policy domains 
that are the objects in the shifting process. Budgetary policy mainly is at stake, but also 
banking regulation and monetary policy are partly involved. The second part of the 
paper deals with the relevant aspects of the theories on the division of powers along 
vertical and horizontal lines. The fiscal federalism approach to vertical separation and 
the time consistency theory on the horizontal distribution of power are briefly exposed. 
In the third part the power shifts occurring within the new EU economic governance 
are presented and defined in terms of our framework of vertical and horizontal power 
shifts. Finally the accountability problems of these shifts are analyzed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The central thesis of this paper is that the discussion on how the EU deals with the euro 
crisis is often misguided by an exaggerated focus on vertical power shifts. Debating the 
need for ‘more Europe’ or ‘less Europe’ should be augmented by a discussion on 
horizontal power shifts (more discretion versus more rules). Such a two-dimensional 
approach is better suited to clarify what is at stake when introducing the new EU 	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economic governance and sheds a light on the different accountability aspects of this 
new economic governance. 
A good recent example is found in the call by the French president Hollande for an 
economic government for the euro zone ‘that would have a full-time president, its own 
budget and a coordinated tax system’ (17 May 2013). A better illustration for the view 
that ‘more Europe’ is the way to solving the euro crisis can probably not be found. At 
the same time Hollande blamed the European austerity measures for the recession of 
the European economy, thereby assimilating more Europe with less austerity. This 
position is difficult to rhyme however with Hollande’s statement of May 30th: "La 
Commission ne dit pas à la place des Etats ce qu'ils doivent faire". ‘Less Europe’ thus, in 
line with the Dutch government that also called for ‘less Europe’ on 21 June 2013. The 
common thread here is the vertical focus: shifting power from member states to the 
European Union or vice versa, reflecting the difficult trade off between efficiency in  
tackling the euro crisis and safeguarding national sovereignty and political legitimacy.  
However, this discussion hides another discussion, namely the debate over discretion 
versus rules. The overall tendency is that governments delegate competencies to more 
or less independent agencies or replace their discretionary power by rules. This 
tendency can also be observed in EU economic governance. This is a horizontal shift of 
powers, with a different impact on democratic legitimacy than the vertical shift. 
In this paper we first introduce the new EU economic governance. Next we focus on 
the theoretical frameworks that economists use to analyze shifts, namely fiscal 
federalism literature for the vertical ones and time inconsistency literature for the 
horizontal ones. Finally the different impacts on accountability are considered. 
 
 
2. What should be governed? 
 
The subject of this paper is the new EU economic governance. The meaning of this 
concept is not strictly defined. At all times supervising budgetary and macroeconomic 
policy is part of it. This is the so-called ‘fiscal union’. Also a stronger control of 
financial institutions, the so-called ‘banking union’, usually falls under the concept. We 
also count in the extra dimension in monetary policy since the introduction of so-called 
‘non-standard’ measures. Furthermore the development of a European fiscal capacity 
with the various mechanisms and institutions (i.e. the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability 
Mechanism) created in the wake of the euro crisis are taken by us to be part of the 
concept of new economic governance. 
This evolvement of economic governance can be regarded as a – retarded – completion 
of economic union in the Balassa (1961) sequence of integration stages. In the stage of 
economic union the goal is to coordinate or even harmonize economic policies. 
Balassa himself vaguely mentions the suppression of ‘restrictions on commodity and 
factor policies’. Economic union precedes ‘total economic integration’. This final stage 
in integration presumes ‘the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical 
policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose decisions are 
binding for the member states’. The monetary union and the introduction of the euro 
brought about this stage, in a partial sense however since not all EU member states 
participate and only monetary policy was unified. EU economic governance than has 
to fill the gap, giving substance to the ‘Economic’ in Economic and Monetary Union. 
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This paper focuses on the three policy domains that occupy a central place in the way 
the euro crisis is approached through the new economic governance of the EU, namely 
financial supervision, fiscal policy and monetary policy.  
The euro crisis appears in two forms: on the one hand problems in the financial sector 
and on the other hand public finance problems. The banking crisis that emerged late 
2007 was caused by risk policies of financial institutions gone wrong and the apparent 
inability of the authorities to assess and control the systemic risks. This failure led the 
governments to the re-examination of financial supervision. Hence, financial 
supervision will be included in this paper. The modifications to supervision contain 
elements of a vertical shift, from national monitoring to European supervision, as well 
as a horizontal shift, from political authorities to independent bodies. 
The approach of the banking problems through government interventions such as state 
guarantees and recapitalization led to the transmission of the financial crisis to the 
fiscal domain. Within the euro area, the fiscal problems were also caused by the 
irresponsible fiscal policies in some Member States such as Greece and Portugal.  
In the short-term approach to the euro crisis the European Central Bank was involved. 
This brings the monetary policy into the picture. This is an example of a policy domain 
that, on the vertical axis, has moved completely to the supranational level, and, on the 
horizontal axis, is completely situated in the corner of independence. 
In the longer term the focus is on the reform of budget rules. The simultaneous vertical 
and horizontal shift is highly visible here. The new EU economic governance puts its 
stakes on a Europeanization of budgetary policy by stiffening the European grip on 
budget rules, but also by the introduction of stabilisation mechanisms and facilities in 
order to organize financial solidarity between EU member states. Furthermore, plans for 
the introduction of Eurobonds and the idea to create ‘a fiscal capacity’ (Van Rompuy, 
2012) add to this process. 
 
 
3. Vertical and horizontal power shifts 
 
In this section we explain the concepts of vertical and horizontal shifts in the 
framework of fiscal federalism, resp. inconsistency literature. 
 
 
3.1. Vertical shifts: fiscal federalism 
 
Fiscal federalism has as its aim to provide insight into the question of which 
governmental functions in the economy have to be placed on which government level. 
To that purpose a good starting point is the subdivision by Musgrave (1959) of 
economic functions of government in allocation, redistribution and stabilization. Each 
of the three policy domains covered in this paper – budgetary policy, monetary policy 
and banking supervision - can be assigned to the three Musgravian functions.  
Concerning redistribution the conventional wisdom is that it should be placed at the 
highest level possible. Lower levels of government that consider engaging in 
redistribution risk to be confronted with inflows of relatively low incomes and outflows 
of relatively high incomes. On the one hand this would exert an upward pressure on 
government spending and a downward pressure on the tax base and tax income. As 
distances increase, this kind of unwanted mobility is supposed to decrease. The higher 
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is the level of redistribution, the longer the distances and the smaller the mentioned 
kind of mobility. 
Another argument in favour of keeping the redistribution as central as possible comes 
from situations in which personal redistribution cannot avoid income distribution 
between jurisdictions that is considered too unequal. In that case a central 
redistribution policy towards local jurisdictions can be necessary. A cause of such a 
situation can be tax bases differing strongly because of differing stages of development. 
Especially when this occurs within a monetary union where the exchange rate 
instrument cannot be used to correct imbalances, an internal redistribution can be 
attractive. This is the familiar context of the European structural funds, as well as the 
explicit redistribution system of the Finanzausgleich in Germany and the implicit 
transfers between Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation is a function that economists like to reserve for higher 
levels of government as well. Stabilisation policy quickly looses its effectiveness as the 
economy becomes more open. The more important external trade and financial flows 
become vis-à-vis the rest of the economy, the bigger the leaks that would be brought 
about by a stabilisation policy through the budget. Stabilisation through monetary 
policy is even more problematic at a lower level since the main instrument of this 
policy, the control over the money supply, is usually situated at central levels. 
In the field of allocation conflicting arguments are put forward. Some of these 
arguments lead to a preference for a lower level of government: differences in 
preferences between jurisdictions, the subsidiarity principle and the Tiebout theorem. 
Other opinions tend to prefer more centralized levels for the allocation function: the 
phenomena of tax export, tax competition and spill over effects, and economies of 
scale in tax collection and in the production of public services. In general the former 
opinions tend to dominate, so most economists would favour as much decentralization 
in allocation as is possible. 
We know apply these insights from fiscal federalism to the three policy domains in the 
EU new economic governance. We assume a simple multilevel governance framework 
with two levels of government: supranational and national (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Government policies, functions and levels 
 
 budgetary policy monetary policy banking supervision 
Supranational level stabilisation & 
redistribution 
stabilisation allocation 
National level stabilisation & 
allocation 
stabilisation allocation 
 
 
Budgetary policy covers the three Musgravian functions. From the theory of fiscal 
federalism we detain that budgetary policy with stabilisation and redistribution as 
objectives are best situated at a higher level, while budgetary policy aiming at 
allocation is best situated at a lower level (see table 1). Monetary policy mainly is a 
matter of stabilisation and is therefore best placed at higher levels of government. The 
choice of exchange rate system is relevant here. In a system of fixed exchange rates, 
and a fortiori a common currency system, monetary policy has to be conducted by 
definition at the level of the fixed rate or currency zone. In a floating rate system the 
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national level can keep its responsibility over monetary policy. The need for banking 
supervision follows from the contingency of market failure in the form of systemic risk. 
Here government has to avoid the external effects of eventual bankruptcy of a financial 
institution. The degree of market integration with other countries then determines 
which level of government is best suited for banking supervision. The higher the degree 
of market integration the higher the level at which supervision should be organized. 
It becomes clear by now that the degree of market integration within the European 
Union has an important impact on the decision on which level responsibility for the 
three policy domains should be placed. The creation of a single market in the European 
Union has caused the Europeanization of financial markets and institutions and the 
need to control them on a European level. The creation of the monetary union caused 
the obvious shift of monetary policy to the supranational level and initiated the less 
obvious and much discussed shift of budgetary powers. The euro crisis speeded up this 
discussion. 
 
 
3.2. Horizontal shifts: credibility, rules and independence 
 
The interest taken by academics in the credibility of economic policy originated in the 
eighties. Especially the numerous exchange rate alignments in the European Monetary 
System created a fertile breeding ground for this attention. The credibility of central 
banks and the role therein of independence from politics took a central place in this 
discussion. The credibility issue was however not confined to exchange rate policy but 
was quickly applied to the general macroeconomic policy. It entered the domain of 
fiscal policy through the introduction of budgetary rules. By the end of the 20th century 
the interest in credibility spread to microeconomic policy areas, leading to insights in 
how best to address the regulation of economic sectors such as network industries. 
Credibility emerged as an important concept, as well as independence as a condition 
for credibility. 
The ‘credibility hypothesis’ is stated extensively in the literature (Gilardi, 2002; Gilardi 
2006, Genoud, 2003, Larsen et al. 2006). Credibility is a valuable asset for 
governments, because rational individuals base their expectations on all economically 
available information at the moment of decision. Rational actors’ beliefs are influenced 
by beliefs about future actions of policy makers. Credibility is the capacity for inspiring 
belief. A credible policy is a policy worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable. A 
politician/government/regulator is credible when agents believe he will fulfil his 
promises. Credibility is needed when coercion is not an option for policy makers.  
Connected to credible policy making is the time-inconsistency problem.  A typical 
situation is posed by investment decisions in a liberalized setting. These decisions are 
made by private investors and not longer by government itself or by public companies. 
Another typical situation is when economic actors make decisions about wages and 
prices in the context of the goals for monetary policy set by government. 
This latter kind of situation was the starting point for the literature on central bank 
independence. In a seminal paper, Kydland and Prescott (1977) stress the importance 
of an independent central bank because there is a potential conflict between 
policymakers’ discretion and policy optimality, called the ‘time inconsistency of 
policy’. Often policymakers need to credibly bind themselves to a fixed and pre-
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announced course of action. Otherwise the danger exists that policy is altered because 
of changes in preferences of policymakers (Gilardi 2006).  
In a more general sense a time consistent policy is a policy that will be sustained as 
circumstances change over time. Adhering to a policy rule may require pursuing a 
policy at a particular point in time that is not optimal at that time. In contrast, policy 
that is time inconsistent will be reversed in the future due to predictable developments 
over time. In a typical democratic setting time inconsistency will be the rule rather than 
the exception as democracies are characterized by the short term time horizons of 
politicians in view of elections and by the accompanying changes of the ruling party or 
coalition. 
A prerequisite to guarantee a time consistent policy is to create a commitment 
mechanism for removing the risk of opportunistic policy in particular contingencies. 
Usually two devices are available. The first is to delegate decision making to an 
independent institution (Gilardi, 2002). In this way, governments prohibit themselves 
and future policymakers from taking shortsighted decisions. They ‘tie their hands’, so it 
will be politically more costly to overrule a decision made by an agency. Thus 
policymakers cannot use discretionary policy as a mechanism to favour a particular 
interest group. The more independent an agency is, the more credible the policy is for 
stakeholders, potential investors, consumers, etc. Policymakers delegate to increase the 
credibility of their policy commitments. A second device is to install policy rules. 
Politicians give up their discretion in decision-making and commit to a policy rule that 
was set previously by. In that way politicians again tie their hands to analogous effects 
as with delegation. 
For the purpose of this paper the relevant policy domains to study with respect to 
delegation and rules are again financial supervision - as a part of regulatory policy -, 
fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
In regulatory policy credibility is mainly pursued by delegating competences to 
independent institutions, especially in the aftermath of utilities privatization and 
liberalization (Gilardi 2002 and 2006). Policy makers have incentives to promise a 
favourable regulatory environment to attract investors, necessary for fostering 
competition. Once relatively irreversible investments are made, policymakers may be 
tempted to go back on their commitment. Rational investors will not invest in the first 
place, creating a suboptimal situation. In the literature this is called the ‘hold up’ 
problem (Kirkpatrick, Parker & Zheng 2006). To avoid this problem governments all 
over the world have established independent regulators to take over the 
implementation of regulatory policy. In the field of finance independent supervisors 
have been around for several decennia. 
In the field of fiscal policy the problem has mainly been tackled in another way, 
namely by introducing fiscal rules. This does not forego that delegation of parts of the 
fiscal policy making (f.i. forecasting growth) has taken place in some countries at some 
points in time. The objective of fiscal policy is to run the budget in the interest of 
society along the three Musgravian functions. The budget is the instrument of fiscal 
policy. It has itself the characteristic of a common pool resource, in the sense that 
exclusion of various special interest groups calling on the budget is difficult while this 
appeal is rival. This feature leads to so called deficit bias, meaning that the frequency of 
negative budget balances tend to be higher than the frequency of positive balances. 
The perspective of spending more and taxing less in a recession is attractive to 
politicians. In that case they can meet the multiple budgetary wishes of interest groups 
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and voters without having to let pay the price in the form of higher taxes, all this in 
hope of an electoral return. The inverse does not happen in an overheated economy: 
against the prescription of functional finance no surplus is created. Higher taxes and 
lower spending are not very attractive from an electoral point of view. Politicians steer 
clear of them and infect public finance wit a deficit bias. This deficit bias reflects a time 
inconsistency problem in the sense described in the preceding paragraph whereby the 
long-term discipline objective is systematically overlooked when short-term discretion 
is being used.  
The adoption of fiscal rules has been considered as the instrument of choice to deal 
with deficit bias (Debrun & Kumar 2008).  The history of fiscal rules is impressive. All 
over the world over the last decennia countries have experimented with fiscal rules. A 
fiscal rule is defined as "a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a 
summary indicator of fiscal performance" (Kopits & Symansky 1998). There are rules 
available on deficit limits, spending limits, taxing limits, debt limits, etc. (see IMF 
(2009). Nevertheless there is no consensus in the literature on whether fiscal rules are a 
robust remedy against the deficit bias. This is painfully shown by the recent Greek and 
Irish case, but it was already predicted in tempore non suspecto:  “In the particular case 
of monetary unions, the centralization of monetary policy can reduce individual 
countries’ incentives for fiscal discipline. Normally, the unpleasant prospect that 
excessive public debt may ultimately increase future inflation and interest rates is likely 
to impose some self-restraint on governments. In a monetary union, however, this effect 
is likely to be diluted, particularly for the smaller members of the union, and could lead 
to excessive debt accumulation (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999). In addition, monetary 
unions can entail a moral hazard related to the greater likelihood of a bailout by other 
member states or by the common central bank.” (Debrun e.a. 2009). 
This brings us to delegation to fiscal institutions as an alternative or a complement to 
fiscal rules. Debrun e.a. (2009) make a distinction between two types of fiscal 
institutions. The first type are called fiscal councils. These councils take up tasks of 
independent analysis, forecasts or normative judgments and in this way help to 
improve fiscal policy. Van Meensel (2008) attributes either positive or normative 
functions to fiscal councils.  To the first category belong institutions, which produce 
macroeconomics forecasts, public finance forecasts, impact analyses of shocks and 
policies. The second institutional category makes policy recommendations and/or 
assessments of fiscal performance in comparison with targets. Neither type of fiscal 
councils receives any specific authority over fiscal policy (Bogaert e.a. 2006). Fiscal 
councils add value to the policy process by affecting policymakers’ incentives and 
motivations. There can be an impact through public debate of the findings of fiscal 
councils. There is evidence suggesting that fiscal councils of the second category 
generally contribute more to fiscal discipline than those of the first category (Debrun 
e.a. 2009). 
In monetary policy delegation as well as policy rules have been used extensively. 
Nowadays more or less independent central banks are standard procedure in most 
Western countries, while rules – in this context usually called targets – are widely used. 
Taylor (2013) points to the eighties and nineties, a period of ‘the more rule focus on 
price stability and the closer adherence to simple predictable policy rules’, while since 
then ‘monetary policy became much less rule like’. Goodfriend (2012 and Issing (2012) 
comment on the shifts in independence of central banks in the long term.  
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4. Transformation of EU economic governance 
 
4.1. New European fiscal rules  
 
The Stability and Growth Pact as it was conceived since 2005 was not up to the task of 
avoiding the budgetary problems related to the euro crisis. Although there have been 
numerous violations of the pact, there have been very few sanctions. In the wake of the 
euro crisis the insight developed that the absence of a really enforceable and European 
wide framework for fiscal policy was responsible for this crisis. To give substance to 
this so-called  ‘economic governance’ takes time however, given the complicated 
decision making system in the European Union. Moreover this economic governance is 
not limited to budgetary policy (‘fiscal governance’) in the member states. It also 
includes broader measures to tackle macroeconomic imbalances. 
The framework for budgetary policy in the new EU economic governance consists of 
 The European semester 
 The measures of the so-called ‘six-pack’ 
 The ‘fiscal compact’ 
 The measures of the ‘two-pack’ 
 
The system of the European semester was used for the first time in 2011 and introduces 
a coordinated cycle for the supervision of the economic and fiscal policies of the 
member states. Before economic policies of the member states were discussed in the 
EU in the spring, separately from the discussions on fiscal policies that were held in the 
autumn. The European semester combines the European governance in the first 
semester of the calendar year. Following the European semester the member states can 
take necessary decisions on their fiscal policies for the following fiscal year in the 
‘national’ semester. In this way the European semester brings forward and strengthens 
the supervision of the stability and convergence programmes submitted by the member 
states. Starting point is the Commission’s January growth report. In February come the 
debates and briefing in the thematic Councils of Ministers and the European 
Parliament. The European Council then decides on the priorities in March and in April 
member states submit their stability or convergence programme. In June the European 
Council approves the country-specific recommendations. 
The ‘six-pack’ consists of five regulations and one directive. The regulations are in force 
since December 2011. The measures in the six-pack start from the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact and reinforce and supplement them. The preventive arm of 
the pact is reinforced by an improved monitoring of the medium term structural targets. 
An expenditure benchmark will be used in function of the medium term potential 
growth. A sanction in the form of a interest-bearing deposit of 0,2 % of gdp is foreseen 
for non-compliant member states. The strengthening of the corrective arm mainly 
consists of the operationalization of the debt criterion. The excess of the debt ratio 
above 60 % of gdp has to decrease by 1/20 yearly. An important modification was 
implemented in the decision making process on sanctions in the excessive deficit 
procedure. Sanctions are now decided upon by reversed qualified majority voting, 
meaning that in the Ecofin Council of Ministers a sanction can only be avoided when a 
qualified majority is found. 
The six-pack also contains a directive that has to be transposed by 2014. This directive 
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envisages the obligation for the member states to involve an institution independent 
from politics in certain aspects of the budgetary process. Finally the six-pack also 
foresees a closer monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances. The Commission 
introduced ‘scoreboards’ wherein important macroeconomic indicators for the member 
states are listed and compared to preset targets. 
The ‘fiscal compact’ actually is the budgetary part of the broader Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance concluded on 2 March 2012 by 25 EU member states. 
The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic opted to stay out of this treaty. The Treaty 
came into force on the 1st of January 2013. It is an intergovernmental agreement and as 
such is not a part of the EU legislation. The fiscal compact introduces the ‘golden rule’ 
whereby the structural fiscal deficit may not be higher than 0,5 % of gdp (1 % for 
member states with a debt ratio not exceeding 60 % of gdp). There is an automatic 
correction mechanism, with escape clauses however for exceptional economic 
conditions. Independent budgetary councils at the member states level have to control 
the compliance with this rule. The rule has to be implemented in national legislation 
and the European Court of Justice can impose a fine of 0,1 % of gdp in case this 
implementation is not properly done. 
On top of these measures two other regulations came into force in May 2013 (the ‘two-
pack’). One regulation again concerns an explicitation of the Stability and Growth Pact 
and specifically of the excessive deficit procedure. The role of numerical fiscal rules 
and of the independent fiscal councils that have to monitor the compliance with the 
rules is specified. This is done against the background of a timeline that explicits the 
timing of the submission of draft budgetary plans and the assessment of these plans by 
the European Commission. The second regulation concerns strengthened surveillance 
of countries in difficulties. 
The new EU economic governance in the fiscal domain not only deals with stricter 
rules, monitoring and sanctioning. It also addresses the problem of financial solidarity 
between member states. There are several aspects of a stronger financial involvement of 
the EU in the budgetary function. The acute crises in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain 
and Cyprus have inspired the European Union to set up financial rescue operations. 
The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) supports all EU Member 
States, with current focus on euro area Member States, up to EUR 60 billion, activated 
for Ireland for up to EUR 22.5 billion and for Portugal for up to EUR 26 billion. The 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was also created in response to the financial 
crisis that began in 2008 and provided temporary stability support to euro-area Member 
States. It is a ‘société anonyme’ set up under Luxembourgish law on 7 June 2010, as 
part of the May 2010 package, mandated to provide financial assistance on a 
temporary basis and thus able to enter into new programmes only until 30 June 2013; 
although the EFSF will continue to service existing commitments thereafter. The EFSF 
provides financial assistance to euro area Member States, linked to appropriate 
conditionality. It obtains financing by issuing bonds or other debt instruments on the 
financial markets backed by guarantees of the shareholder Member States. These 
guarantees total €780 billion. As a result of the Greek, Irish and Portuguese 
programmes, the EFSF has effective guarantees totalling €726 billion that provide a 
lending capacity of €440 billion. Contrary to the EFSF the European Stability 
Mechanism (EMS) is a permanent international financial institution that assists in 
preserving the financial stability of the European Union monetary union by providing 
temporary stability support to euro area Member States. The ESM was finally 
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inaugurated on 8 October 2012 upon completion of the ratification process by the 
participating euro area Member States. The ESM issues bonds or other debt instruments 
on the financial markets to raise capital to provide assistance to member states. Unlike 
the EFSF, which was based upon euro area member state guarantees, the ESM has a 
total subscribed capital of €700 billion provided by euro area member states. €80 
billion of this is in the form of paid-in capital with the remaining €620 billion as 
callable capital. This subscribed capital provides a lending capacity for the ESM of 
€500 billion. 
Besides these rescue operations already in place the European Union is discussing 
further ideas on expanding its budgetary role. Van Rompuy (2012) launched the idea of 
‘establishing a well-defined and limited fiscal capacity to improve the absorption of 
country specific economic shocks, through an insurance system set up at the central 
level’. The European Commission in December 2011 published a green paper on ‘the 
feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds’ (European Commission 2011). One of the 
ideas proposed is to let member states finance the part of their government debt under 
60% of gdp through the common issuance of bonds. This would enable the member 
countries with a lower creditworthiness to benefit from the lower interest rates paid in 
the capital markets by more creditworthy member states for that part of their debt. The 
debt above 60 % of gdp should still be financed by individual issuance. 
Last item to mention is a proposal by the former president of the ECB, Jean-Claude 
Trichet. Trichet proposes to replace the sanctioning fines in case a member state has an 
excessive deficit by fiscal measures proposed by the European Commission and 
endorsed by the European Council and the European Parliament (De Standaard 2013). 
 
 
4.2. The formation of a banking union 
 
The banking crisis in the euro area and wider has led the EU to undertake steps towards 
the creation of a banking union. The intention of a banking union is to transfer to the 
European level the mechanisms of financial supervision and the prevention and 
remediation of banking crises. 
Elliot (2012) points at the following more detailed reasons for a banking union: 
 Dealing with existing bank weaknesses that contributes to the euro crisis; 
 Reducing the risk that banking will contribute to later stages of the euro crisis; 
 Restoring the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy; 
 Reintegrating the European banking system; 
 Fixing long-standing problems with the single market in EU banking. 
The euro area poses specific risks, as pooled monetary responsibilities have spurred 
close economic and financial integration. Cross-border spillover effects in the event of 
bank crises are more likely to occur. Moreover the link between sovereign debt and 
bank debt and the vicious circle which has led to tax-payers money being used to 
rescue banks in the EU has to be broken. Next there is an increasing risk of 
fragmentation of EU banking markets This risk significantly undermines the single 
market for financial services and impairs the effective transmission of monetary policy 
to the real economy throughout the euro area.  
The role of government regarding external effects in the financial sector has two 
dimensions. The first dimension is macroprudential supervision that has to keep an eye 
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on the stability of the financial system. Stability is the capacity of the financial system to 
withstand shocks and financial imbalances. Disturbances in financial intermediation 
should be avoided by this kind of supervision at the same time guaranteeing an efficient 
transmission of savings to profitable investments. The second dimension is 
microeconomic supervision. This kind of supervision is in the first place responsible for 
the solidity of individual financial institutions (microprudential supervision). It concerns 
capital requirements as laid down in the successive versions of the Basel Agreements 
(Basel I, Basel II, Basel III). In the second place it deals with the conduct of business 
supervision aimed at the way financial institutions deal with customers. To this purpose 
supervisors usually introduce on the supply of information to customers, on the 
integrity of management and staff, acceptable commercial practices, marketing 
practices, etc. (Llewellyn, 1999). 
In a first approach the EU undertook to coordinate the supervision of individual 
member states over their financial sector. To this end the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) was established at the beginning of 2011 to implement the de 
Larosière Group’s proposed greater integration of European financial supervision. This 
supervisory network consists of the national supervisory authorities of the 27 EU 
member states, the three new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), their Joint 
Committee and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Together with the national 
supervisory authorities, the three ESAs (the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)) help to improve the quality and coherence of 
microprudential supervision in the EU and to strengthen cross-border supervision. 
However when the euro crisis deepened this step quickly appeared to be insufficient. 
‘Coordination between supervisors is vital but the crisis has shown that mere 
coordination is not enough, in particular in the context of a single currency and that 
there is a need for common decision making’ (European Commission, 2012b). 
The next answer to the crisis was the creation of a banking union. To that end the 
Commission proposed to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). A 
unanimous agreement was reached on this proposal in the Ecofin Council on 13 
December. Following trilogue negotiations during January and February, the 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission reached agreement on the package on 19 
March 2013 (European Commission 2013). 
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first step towards a 
banking union. Next steps will include also a single bank resolution mechanism, 
underpinned by a single rulebook and a common deposit guarantee scheme. 
The SSM applies to all the euro area member states and is open to the participation of 
other member states. To that end these non-euro area member states may establish a 
close cooperation between their supervisory authorities and the ECB.  
The Regulation establishing the SSM confers key supervisory tasks and powers to the 
ECB over all the 6000 credit institutions established within the euro area. The ECB 
carries out its tasks within a SSM composed of the ECB and national competent 
authorities. The ECB shall ensure the coherent and consistent application of the Single 
rulebook in the euro area. It will directly supervise banks having assets of more than 
EUR 30 billion or constituting at least 20% of their home country's gdp or which have 
requested or received direct public financial assistance from the EFSF or the ESM. Less 
significant banks will be supervised by national supervisors, while these supervisors 
will be under the monitoring of the ECB. 
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The ECB may at any moment decide however to directly supervise one or more of these 
credit institutions to ensure consistent application of supervisory standards. The work of 
the national supervisors is integrated into the SSM. For instance, the ECB will send 
instructions to national supervisors, and national supervisors have a duty to notify the 
ECB of supervisory decisions of material consequence. 
The governance structure of the ECB will consist of a separate Supervisory Board 
supported by steering committee, the ECB Governing Council, and a mediation panel 
to solve disagreements that may arise between national competent authorities and the 
Governing Council. Clear separation between the ECB’s monetary tasks and 
supervisory tasks is fully ensured. 
For cross-border banks active both within and outside member states participating in 
the SSM, existing home/host supervisor coordination procedures will continue to exist 
as they do today. To the extent that the ECB has taken over direct supervisory tasks, it 
will carry out the functions of the home and host authority for all participating Member 
States. 
The rules on the functioning of the EBA will be adapted and its role reinforced. The 
EBA will continue developing the single rulebook applicable to all member states. In 
order to foster consistency and efficiency of supervisory practices across the whole 
Union, it will develop a single supervisory handbook. It will also ensure that regular 
stresstests are carried out to assess the resilience of European banks. 
There will be safeguards for non-euro zone member states by means of double majority 
voting requirements for EBA decisions on mediation and on technical standards. This 
ensures that decisions are backed by both a majority of the participating and the non-
participating member states. 
 
 
4.3. The transformation of monetary policy 
 
Monetary policy in the euro zone lies in the hands of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). It comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central 
banks. The ECB is a supranational institution that is moreover to a great extent 
independent from EU political decision-making. The highest decision making body of 
the ECB is the Governing Council comprising the members of the Executive Board and 
the governors of the national central banks of the euro area countries. The Executive 
Board consists of six members, the president, the vice-president and four members, all 
of them chosen for their recognised professional experience in monetary and banking 
matters. They are appointed by common accord of the governments of the euro area at 
the highest level. The Governing Council and the Executive Board are presided by the 
president of the ECB (momentarily Mario Draghi). The third decision-making body is 
the General Council, comprising of the president and vice-president of the ECB and the 
presidents of the central banks of all EU member states. The ECB and the national 
central banks in the euro area form the Eurosystem. 
The primary objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price stability. In addition it has 
to support the general economic policy of the EU, but price stability has absolute 
priority. This unique objective simplifies the strategy of the Eurosystem vis-à-vis 
countries were central banks have to pursue multiple objective (cf. the Fed in the US). 
An important feature of the statutes of the system is the independence of the ECB from 
political government. Personal as well as functional independence are guaranteed. The 
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personal independence is secured by the procedure for the appointment of the 
members of the Executive Board and of the governors of the national central banks. The 
members of the Board are appointed for a non-renewable term of eight years and the 
governors for a term of five years. They can only be removed by the Court of Justice in 
case of incapacity or of serious misconduct. Functional independence is guaranteed by 
Article 7 of the statutes of the ESCB: ‘Neither the ECB nor a national central bank nor 
any member of their decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from 
community institutions or bodies, from any government of a member state or from any 
other body.’ It is not permitted for the Eurosystem to make loans to governments. That 
the ECB is indeed highly independent is seen in a comparison of central bank 
independence based on five indicators by De Haan (1997). The ECB scores the 
maximum on three indicators and just below the maximum for the remaining two 
indicators. 
Price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase of the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices in the euro area of below 2 %. The operational variables for monetary 
policy used by the ECB are the interest rates on the money market. To steer these 
interest rates in the money market the ECB has at its disposal open market operations, 
standing facilities and reserve requirements. The most important instruments of open 
market operations are the main refinancing operations that provide liquidity with a 
frequency and maturity of one week. The interest rate for this liquidity – the main 
refinancing operations rate - is the central rate in the system and attracts a lot of media 
attention. In May 2013 it was put at 0,50 %. Besides this facility the ECB also holds 
longer-term refinancing operations with maturities of three months. The standing 
facilities offer lending and deposit facilities for the overnight money of banks. The 
marginal lending facility allows banks to obtain liquidity, while the deposit facility 
allows them to deposit superfluous overnight money. For the first facility a rate of 1 % 
was valid in May 2013, while the rate for the deposit facility was 0 %. The reserve 
requirements oblige banks to hold minimum reserves in accounts with the national 
central banks (2 % of deposits until the beginning of 2012, since then 1 %). 
Since the financial crisis the ECB has ventured unknown paths. Besides price stability 
(and the brand new supervisory tasks, cf. supra) avoiding systemic risk by providing 
financial means has become important. New facilities were designed by the ECB as 
well for financial institutions as for governments of member states. 
From the start of tensions in the interbank markets in August 2007, the ECB accommodated 
the funding needs of banks. “The banks needed to build up daily liquidity buffers so as to 
reduce uncertainty about their liquidity positions. The ECB provided unlimited overnight 
liquidity to banks (€95 billion on the first day). Later on, the ECB conducted supplementary 
refinancing operations with maturities of up to 6 months, compared with a maximum of 3 
months in normal times. Temporary swap lines were established with other central banks, 
primarily to address the mounting pressure in short-term US dollar funding markets. As a 
result, the tensions in the short-term segment of the euro area money market abated 
considerably” (Cour-Thimann & Winkler 2012). 
“Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, the uncertainty 
about the financial health of major banks worldwide led to a collapse in financial activity. 
Banks built up large liquidity buffers, while shedding risks from their balance sheets and 
tightening loan conditions. Given the crucial importance of banks for the financing of the 
euro area economy, this situation was alarming in view of a high risk of a credit crunch and 
a high risk of the central bank’s inability to steer monetary conditions” (Cour-Thimann & 
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Winkler 2012). 
The ECB, like other major central banks, rapidly reduced its key interest rates to historically 
low levels, but a key element of its response to retain effectiveness in influencing monetary 
conditions consisted of non-standard policy measures.  The ECB adopted a number of these 
non-standard measures to support financing conditions and credit flows to the euro area 
economy over and beyond what could be achieved through the normal reductions in key 
interest rates alone.  
The main components of these measures concerned a fixed-rate full allotment tender 
procedure for all refinancing operations during the financial crisis and the extension of the 
maturity of liquidity provision. The maximum maturity of the longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) was temporarily extended (to 12 months in June 2009). In combination 
with the first element, this contributed to keeping money market interest rates at low levels. 
Besides these two elements other features of the ECB approach included the extension of 
collateral eligibility, currency swap agreements and the introduction of a covered bond 
purchase programme (CBPP). The aim of this last programme was to revive the covered 
bond market, which is a primary source of funding for banks in large parts of the euro area.  
The evidence available suggests that the non-standard measures taken in October 2008 
have been instrumental in stabilizing the financial system and the economy, as well as in 
ensuring price stability (Cour-Thimann & Winkler 2012).  
“In early 2010 the euro area sovereign debt crisis began with acute market expectations 
about a possible Greek sovereign default, with a risk of impact on Ireland, Portugal, and 
even Spain and Italy. In May 2010 some secondary markets for government bonds began to 
dry up completely; large-scale sale offers faced virtually no buy orders and yields reached 
levels that would have quickly become unsustainable for any sovereign. To help calm the 
market down and support a better functioning of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, the ECB established its Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Under the SMP, 
interventions could be carried out in the euro area public and private debt securities 
markets, strictly limited however to secondary markets” (Cour-Thimann & Winkler 2012).  
When the sovereign debt crisis struck Italy and Spain in the summer of 2011 the ECB 
decided to ‘actively implement its Securities Markets Programme’ (Statement by the ECB 
President, 7 August 2011) that had been dormant for several months. Significant and 
sustained interventions at varying intensity in the following weeks temporarily eased the 
situation in government bond markets. 
In the autumn, however, the euro area banking system came increasingly under strain, 
calling for a response. The ECB provided banks not only with a short-term liquidity support 
but also with a sufficient perspective so that they would maintain credit lines.  
Key in this response were the two 3-year Long Term Refinancing Operations. The 
assignments took place on 21 December 2011 and 29 February 2012 respectively. They 
took the form of fixed rate tenders at an interest rate equal to the main refinancing rate 
averaged over the entire maturity. The Eurosystem assigned € 489 bln in the first 
transaction and € 530 bln in the second one. Since these transactions partly replaced 
operations coming to maturity, the net injection of liquidity amounted to € 210 bln and 
€ 311 bln respectively. 
On 6 September 2012 the ECB decided on a scheme to intervene in secondary sovereign 
bond markets subject to strict and effective conditionality, the so-called Outright Monetary 
Transactions OMT.  The effectiveness of these OMT crucially depends on member states 
taking the necessary steps to contribute to the stability of the euro area. This is made clear 
with the strict conditionality of the OMT. The OMT differ from the SMP in the strict 
conditionality of the former. 
	   15	  
It should be stated clearly that until now no changes in terms of statutes of the ESCB/ECB 
have been made concerning the conduct of monetary policy. The changes made concern 
the assigning of a supervisory role to the ECB, with a clear firewall between monetary 
policy and the supervisory role. Moving away from the legislative framework one can 
however see a broadening of the action radius of the ECB. The avoidance of systemic risk 
through LTRO and OMT have taken the ECB in the field of fiscal policy. Although it was 
denied by the ECB (Draghi 2013) this move elicits questions on the independence of the 
ECB. Especially with OMT, where bonds issued by member states governments are bought 
by the ECB on the secondary market, the ECB seems to engage in policies that 
accommodate the governments in their fiscal policies, instead of remaining in its own field 
of monetary policy. 
 
 
4.4. Analysis in terms of horizontal and vertical shifts 
 
The preceeding paragraphs offer a descriptive account of the transformations in the EU 
economic governance. The next step is to systematise these tranformations. We do this 
by listing the concrete elements of the mentioned transformations that contain the kind 
of shifts discussed in section 2. This is done in table 2 were 37 shifts of power are 
enumerated. Of these 37 shifts 19 are in the domain of fiscal union, 8 in banking union 
and 10 in monetary policy. It should be noted that the nature of these power shift is 
very heterogenous. Some power shifts are enacted in legislation (f.i. operationalisation 
of the debt criterion), others are de facto policy measures already implemented (f.i. the 
Outright Monetary Transactions), still others exist only in proposals (f.i. Eurobonds).  
Next we chart the power shifts (see graph 1). The two levels of government are the 
European and the national level. The three kinds of decision-making are discretion, 
delegation and rules. Vertical shifts occur between government levels, horizontal shifts 
between types of decision-making. Diagonal shifts occur when vertical and horizontal 
shifts are combined. Graph 1 shows that from the moment that the credibility 
dimension is taken into account, the simple view of a mere vertical power shift from 
member states to the European Union or the Eurosystem becomes invalid. Instead of 
observing only upward pointing vertical arrows we see many arrows pointing in other 
directions. We distinguish the following types: 
 From discretion at the MS level to discretion at the EU level 
 From discretion at the MS level to rules at the EU level 
 From discretion at the MS level to delegation at the EU level 
 From discretion at the MS level to rules at the MS level 
 From discretion at the MS level to delegation at the MS level 
 From discretion at the EU level to rules at the EU level 
 From discretion at the EU level to delegation at the EU level 
 From discretion at the EU level to discretion at the EU level 
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Table 2: List of power shifts 
 
  Changes (shifts) Code Status 
Fiscal union operationalisation of debt criterion FU1 in force 
  new expenditure rule FU2 in force 
  need to improve structural balance with at least 0,5 % of gdp annually FU3 in force 
  limit of -0,5 % of gdp on structural balance FU4 in force 
  interest bearing deposit of 0,2 % of gdp in case of significant deviation of MTO FU5 in force 
  extra monitoring under EDP FU6 in force 
  fines come earlier at 0,2 % of gdp FU7 in force 
  fine to maximum 0,5 % of gdp in case of statistical fraud FU8 in force 
  decisions on sanctions in EDP with reversed qualified majority voting FU9 in force 
  earlier and higher surveillance for problem countries FU10 in force 
  
national budgetary processes have to be based on independent macro-
economic projections FU11 in force 
  member states have to introduce numerical fiscal rules FU12 in force 
  
member states have to establish independent fiscal councils to monitor 
compliance with fiscal rules FU13 in force 
  European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism FU14 in force 
  European Financial Stability Facility FU15 in force 
  European Stability Mechanism FU16 in force 
  issuing of Stability Bonds FU17 
proposal 
12/2011 
  establishing EU fiscal capacity FU18 
proposal 
12/2012 
  establishing European Ministry of Finance to impose sanctions FU19 
proposal 
04/2013 
Banking 
Union establishing European Systemic Risk Board for macroprudential supervision BU1 in force 
  establishing European Banking Authority (+ EIOPA & ESMA) BU2 in force 
  
establishing European System of Financial Supervision for microprudential 
supervision BU3 in force 
  establishing Single Supervisory Mechanism for banks of eurozone members BU4 in force 
  enforcement of role of EBA BU5 decided 
  single rulebook for entire EU BU6 decided 
  single bank resolution mechanism BU7 proposal 
  common deposit guarantee scheme BU8 proposal 
Monetary 
policy unlimited overnight liquidity to banks (August 2007) MP1 implemented 
  supplementary refinancing operations over 6 months (rest 2007) MP2 implemented 
  
Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) over 12 months (October 2008, 
June 2009) MP3 implemented 
  extension of collateral eligibility (October 2008) MP4 implemented 
  currency swaps (October 2008) MP5 implemented 
  Covered Bond Purchasing Programme (October 2008) MP6 implemented 
  Securities Market Programme (May 2010) MP7 implemented 
  Securities Market Programme revived (summer 2011) MP8 implemented 
  LTRO over 3 years (December 2011 & February 2012) MP9 implemented 
  Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) (September 2012) MP10 implemented 
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Some power shifts have obviously more impact than others, we do not attach weights 
to the power shifts due to a lack of weighing criterion. 
 
 
Graph 1: The direction of power shifts 
 
 
 
4.5. Impact on accountability 
 
The main impact of these insights is on accountability. Vertical shifts from a member 
state government with full discretion to a higher European level of government with full 
discretion poses a problem of accountability in the sense of the perceived democratic 
deficit of the European Union. An extensive political science literature exists on the 
European democratic deficit (Jensen 2009). Horizontal shifts away from discretion to 
rules and delegation also create a problem of accountability, but in another sense and 
in another kind of literature. In fact several bodies of literature deal with this problem. 
There is a body of literature in economics about the accountability of independent 
central banks (De Haan 2000). There is also literature by economists on accountability 
of financial supervisors (Quintyn 2011). Finally there is a mainly political science body 
of literature on the accountability problems of independent regulatory agencies 
(Maggetti 2010) and the accountabilitty issues involved when moving from discretion 
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to rules (Nonet 1980 & and Keech 1992). The cross references between these bodies of 
literature are minimal.  
Accountability has two aspects (Keech 1992). On the one hand the concept refers to 
the degree that policy makers are transparant in their actions as agents and explain 
these actions to their principals. On the other hand it refers to the possibilities that these 
principals have to sanction the agents when their actions diverge from the objectives of 
the principals. ‘Implicitly, the issue of accountability involves delegation of authority 
from the public, the ultimate principal, to elected officials as agents, and from elected 
officials to appointed officials as agents’ (Keech 1992).  
This view is relevant for our types of power shifts. In the case of vertical shifts from the 
member state level to the European level, the member states act as principal and the 
European level as a multiheaded agent consisting mainly of the European Council, 
Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission. With the exception 
of the Commission, whose members are appointed, these institutions consist of elected 
politicians. Nevertheless, according to the literature that focuses on procedural 
legitimacy of the European construction (‘input democracy’ according to Orbie 2009), 
a democratic deficit can be observed because of ‘the institutional deficiencies of the 
current electoral and party system and lack of a European demos’ (Jensen 2009). In the 
literature on ‘output democracy’ (Orbie 2009) or ‘output legitimacy’ (Jensen 2009) the 
supposed democratic deficit is subordinated to the success of the European Union in 
solving problems that member states could not have solved on their own. Legitimacy is 
also perceived as less problematic in the ‘multiple points of legitimacy’ approach 
(Jensen 2009). Most of these strands of literature have in common that they focus 
mainly on how legitimacy can be improved. The answers devolve from the specific 
analysis and range from promoting European-wide political parties over more direct 
democracy and the creation of a European identity to enhancing citizen contestatory 
power (Jensen 2009). 
In the case of horizontal power shifts, competences are delegated by elected principals 
to unelected agents or to rules. Here a larger danger of democratic deficit is present 
since ‘the significance of political participation appears undermined’ as Maggetti (2010) 
points out for the case of independent regulatory agencies (IRA’s). For IRA’s Maggetti 
(2009) argues that ‘regulatory governance by independent agencies, although 
uncontested at present, can hardly rely on a strong stock of legitimacy, while the 
development of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism might reinforce the 
ongoing tendencies towards a weakening of the democratic quality of political 
systems’. This is directly relevant to some elements of the new EU economic 
governance such as the EBA and the Single Supervisory Mechanism that was created 
within the ECB as these organisms are intended to behave independently from politics. 
The EBA scores relatively well for accountability in a study by Masciandaro (2011), but 
this is explained mainly by the fact that its ‘role is only backed by limited enforcement 
and sanctioning powers. Its powers are even more limited vis-à-vis individual financial 
institutions, including in the collection of information on the financial condition of 
banks’ (Masciandaro 2011). With the removal of financial supervision to the ECB this 
positive accountability situation might well change. For its traditional tasks in 
implementing monetary policy the ECB is one of the most independent central banks 
worldwide. As a result accountability is not very high, to the extent that ‘although in 
some respects the ECB goes further than the law prescribes’ (De Haan 2000), it still 
cannot be considered to ‘be among the most transparent and accountable central banks 
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in the world’ (Issing 1999).  
Last element in the discussion is the accountability aspect of replacing discretion by 
rules. Indeed the bulk of the measures taken in the framework of the new EU economic 
governance concerns new rules for fiscal policy restraining the discretionary powers of 
member state governments. Nonet (1980), in a general treatise on ‘purposive actions’, 
uses discretion and non-accountability as synonyms: ‘By empowering officials to 
reason from purpose, we deliberately permit decisions that elude criticism and 
justification and thus allow a large measure of unaccountable or discretionary 
authority’. This means that introduction of rules necessarily leads to the opposite result, 
i.e. to an avoidance of discretionary, unaccountable actions: ‘This principle will 
commit us to choose insitutional arrangements under which officials are pressed to 
ground their decisions upon relatively specific standards and are ordinarily denied the 
power to make purposive judgments unmediated by such standards’ (Nonet 1980). This 
should put us at ease when considering the new rules of European governance. 
However, as Keech (1992) explains, ‘rules for macroeconomic policymaking are based 
on theory about how the world works. But in its present state, macroeconomic theory 
does not yield an understanding of the way the world works that is sufficiently clear 
and authoritative to make a solid case for rules.’ More than twenty years later this 
statement appears to be still valid, given the fierce discussions on austerity.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper documents the different shifts of power that are embedded in the new EU 
economic governance that is being implemented to deal with the effects of the euro 
and financial crisis. It is argued that a difference has to be made between vertical shifts 
delegating competences from the level of the member states governments to the 
European level, horizontal shifts of delegating competences to independent institutions 
and rules, and diagonal combinations of vertical and horizontal shifts. The economic 
frameworks for these shifts, respectively fiscal federalism and credibility, were 
sketched. Next the features of the types of shifts were discussed for the three policy 
domains that are covered by the new EU economic governance, i.e. fiscal policy, 
banking supervision and monetary policy. An attempt was then made to systematize 
the observed shifts and charting them in a framework consisting of two levels of 
government (national and European) and three methods of decision-making (discretion, 
rules and delegation). Charting shows that eight different kinds of power shifts are 
embedded in installing the new economic governance. The main impact of this variety 
of shifts is on accountability. The vertical shifts raise other questions than the horizontal 
shifts. The first kind refer to the discussions on the European democratic deficit, while 
the second kind refer to accountability in the context of discretion versus delegation. 
The accountability aspects of these power shifts were addressed in the final paragraph. 
While delegation to independent institutions seems to pose accountability problems 
this is probably not the case for delegation to rules. 
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